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Gerzog: Quinlan Under Ohio Law

A HYPOTHETICAL: QUINLAN UNDER OHIO LAW

W

ITH THE DECISION

by all of the respondents in In re Quinlan1 not

to appeal their case to the United States Supreme Court,2 the
people in this country will have to wait for a definitive statement of law on
a person's right to die and on a guardian's standing to assert that right
for his ward. Because of the dearth of precedent in this area, each state
court that is faced with the prospect of reviewing a case like Quinlan will
have to grapple with its own constitutional and statutory schemes in order
to make a determination of these difficult issues. It is the purpose of this
comment to explore a hypothetical situation, to take the facts of the
Quinlan case as revealed in the New Jersey Superior Court' and the
New Jersey Supreme Court opinions and interpret them under applicable
Ohio law.
The facts of the case reveal that, on the evening of April 15, 1975,
Karen ceased breathing for at least two fifteen-minute periods. Although
there was evidence of quinine, aspirin, barbituates and traces of valium
and librium in her blood, the amounts of these drugs in her bloodstream
were determined to be within the therapeutic range; therefore, the cause
of Karen's unconsciousness remains unknown. The attending physicians
emphasized that because of the absence of a medical history on Karen, a
diagnosis of her condition was necessarily tentative. However, the doctors
asserted that the cessation of breathing resulted in anoxia (lack of oxygen
in the blood) and in her present condition. At Newton Hospital, Karen
was placed on a respirator because she could not breathe spontaneously.
She was in a coma and showed evidence of decorticate posturing. On examination by Dr. Morse, a neurologist, Karen's oculocephalic and oculovestbular reflexes were normal. She was then transferred to the Intensive Care
Unit of St. Clare's Hospital where a catheter was inserted and a tracheostomy performed. While on the respirator, all tests relating to the degree
of acidity and the level of oxygen and carbon dioxide in her blood were
normal.' In addition, her blood pressure was normal.5 The electroencephalogram (EEG) performed on Karen indicated brain activity but failed to
disclose the cause of her unconsciousness.' A brain scan, an angiogram,
'In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
2 See Medical Tribune and Medical News, May 5, 1976, at 1, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as
Medical Tribune].
3 In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (1975).
4 Id. at 237, 348 A.2d at 806-07.

5 70 N.J. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655.
6 137 N.J. Super. at 240, 348 A.2d at 808.
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and a lumbar puncture showed normal results.7 Karen lost a great deal of
weight; her weight dropped from 115 to approximately 75 pounds., Antibiotics and tests were continually administered in order to retard infection
and Karen received regular nursing care. Karen's daily charts revealed her
to exhibit a pale complexion, almost continuous diaphoresis (sweating),
a decerebrate response to pain, yawning, spasms, occasional body rashes,
occasional triggering of and assisting the respirator, occasional rigidity of
her extremities, and on May 7, 1975, nurses noted that Karen blinked
twice in response to their instructions. Although various attempts were
made to wean Karen from the respirator (the longest period off the machine
being one-half hour), they were unsuccessful as her respiratory rate would
rise while her air intake volume would recede. Dr. Javed, Karen's pulmonary
internist, testified that her respiratory problem was reliant on her neurological condition which did not show any improvement.' Drs. Javed and Morse
together with Drs. Cook, Loesser, and Plum all concurred that Karen had
irreversible brain damage; there was no cognitive or cerebral functioning
and some brain stem damage relating to her respiratory functioning." °
I. DEATH: THE SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION
Firstly at issue is the question: is Karen legally dead? If she is, that
conclusion would obviate any problem as to what should be done. No one
would be faced with any kind of liability for their actions subsequent to
this determination and there would be no question of anyone's rights being
invaded." There are several definitions of death that have been offered by
various authorities and have been alternatively designated as biological death,
heart death, total brain death, cerebral death, and lung death. The first of
these definitions is actually a misnomer. According to the biologist, there
is no such thing as death; one merely experiences different stages of existence.'" Such a definition, while philosophically provocative, offers little
help in establishing a legal definition of death.
The classical definition of death is "... . [A] total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions conse-

7

70 N.J. at 23, 355 A.2d at 654.

8 ld. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655; 137 N.J. Super. at 240, 348 A.2d at 807-08.
9 137 N.J. Super. at 241, 348 A.2d at 808-09.
10 d. at 245, 348 A.2d at 810-11.

"1Except for her family who may retain a property right in her corpse. See Meek v.

State, 205 Ind. 102, 185 N.E. 899 (1933).
12

Slater, Death: The Biological Aspect, in

EUTHANASA

(A. Downing ed. 1969).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss1/6
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"
quent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."' It is a static concept
and has been questioned by doctors today, especially in the light of medical
advances with respect to organ transplants and a more modem perspective
of death as an ongoing process."'

Today, most physicians 5 as well as several state statutes" embrace
brain death as determining time of death and, as Dr. Morse expressed,'
the ordinary criteria for declaring brain death are those indicia enunciated
by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School in their 1968
report.' The Harvard characteristics of irreversible coma are: 1) unreceptivity and unresponsitivity to even the most painful stimuli, 2) no spontaneous movements or breathing, 3) no reflexes and 4) a flat EEG. All tests
must be must be repeated at least twenty-four hours later without a change
488 (4th ed. 1968). See Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death Report: A Definition of "Irreversible Coma", in THE DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA 161 (J. Behnke and S. Bok eds. 1975)
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

[hereinafter cited as Report and as DILEMMAS]. The Report cites, Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark.
579, 317 S.W. 2d 275 (1958); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478
(1950) (simultaneous death actions where the heart death definition was applied). Report
at 165-66. See also Meyers, Legal Aspects of Voluntary Medical Euthanasia, in DILEMMAS

62, citing Regina v. Potter, a criminal case, also applying the heart death definition, wherein
it was held that the defendant could only be convicted of assault because, the court concluded,
a subsequent kidney transplant was the direct cause of death. Prior to the transplant, decedent
was on a respirator with his heart still beating after a severe injury to his brain.
14 Address by Dr. Marvin Platt, pathologist, The University of Akron Medical-Legal Conference, May 1, 1976 [hereinafter cited as Platt and as Conference]. See also Friloux,
Death, When Does It Occur?, BAYLOR L. REV. 10, 18 (1975).
15 Address by Dr. W. Paul Kilway, general surgeon, Conference, supra note 14 [hereinafter
cited as Kilway]; Platt, supra note 14, who stressed the interdependent functions of the heart,
brain, and lungs. Several books and law review articles concur with the physicians in their
preference of the brain death definition of death. See 0. RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE 32
(1972) [hereinafter cited as RUSSELL]; Gurney, Is There a Right to Die?, 3 CUMBER.-SAM.

L. REV. 235, 246 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gurney]; Comment, Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, 36 ALBANY L. REV. 674, 688 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 36 ALBANY L. REV.];
Comment, The Tell-Tale Heart, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 157 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 27
BAYLOR L. REV.]; Comment, The Right to Die, 10 CALIF.-WESTERN L. REV. 613 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 10 CALIF.-WESTERN L. REV.]. But see Olinger, Medical Death, 27
BAYLOR

L.

REV.

22, 25 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as Olinger]. For cases accepting the brain

death definition of death, see DILEMMAS, supra note 13, at 171-75, citing People v. Lyons,

15 Crim. L. Rptr. 2240 (Cal. Super Ct. 1974); People v. Flores, 93 Cal. Rptr. 717,
vacated 98 Cal. Rptr. 822, 491 P.2d 406 (1974).

STAT. §09.65.120 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. §77-202 (Supp. 1972);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43 §54(F) (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §1-2-2.2 (Supp. 1975);
VA. CODE ANN. §32-364.3:1 (Supp. 1976). The text of these statutes may be found in
16 ALASKA

Medical-Legal Dilemmas in the Care of the Critically Ill, [hereinafter cited as Medical-Legal],
a handbook prepared for the Conference, supra note 14.
17 137 N.J. Super. at 243, 348 A.2d at 810.
is See Report supra note 13. Cf. Merical-Legal, supra note 16, at 2-5, citing the Minnesota
criteria (irreversible damage to the brain stem) and the Pennsylvania criteria (neocortical

Published
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in results and to insure the validity of this data, hypothermia or central
nervous system depressants must be excluded.19
A definition of cerebral death incorporates partial brain damage wherein the other two parts of the brain may continue functioning, but that part
of the brain that controls cognitive powers, the cerebrum, has irreversibly
ceased.20 A few states have proposed legislation adopting cerebral death
but to date none has passed. 1 There is also some acceptance of this definition
in the medical profession; according to one authority, where there is no hope
of conscious awareness, such a definition reveals good medical practice.22
Finally, a relatively new concept is lung death. Proposed by Dr. Thomas
Oliver in Pittsburgh, death would be determined where there was no
pulmonary improvement after thirty days on a respirator; after that period,
following a joint decision by parents (guardian), physicians, and nursing
staff to discontinue treatment, the artificial life support system would be
removed.23
In the Quinlan case, Karen would not be considered dead under heart
death and brain death definitions; 2" however, she would be viewed as dead
under cerebral death 5 and lung death 26 determinations. It is, therefore,
pivotal to examine Ohio statutory and case law to see whether Ohio has
19 Report, supra note 13. See 70 N.J. at 27, 355 A.2d at 656; 137 N.J. Super. at 243, 348
RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 197.
20 See Olinger, supra note 15. According to Olinger, the Baylor University Medical Center
in Dallas is considering a proposal endorsing the concept of brain death. The New Jersey
Supreme Court approaches a declaration of cerebral death as the definition of death. 70

A.2d at 810;

N.J. at 19-20 n.2, 28, 355 A.2d at 652 n.2, 657. See also Medical Tribune, supra note 2, at

17, cots. 3-4.
See Comment, Proposed State Euthanasia Statute, 3 HOFSPmA L. REV. 115, 127 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as 3 HOFsTRA L. REV.], citing Ore. S.B. 179 (1973), which proposed a
definition of death which included those brain damaged individuals incapable of leading a
rational life. This proposed definition was not accepted. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 146.087 (1975).
22 Survey, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202, 1208 (1973), [hereinafter cited as 48 NoTRE DAME L.], citing
Williamson, Prolongation of Life or Prolonging the Act of Dying?, 202 J.A. M.A. 162
21

(1967).
Address by Dr. Gary Benfield, Director, Regional Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, Akron
Children's Hospital, Conference, supra, note 14 [hereinafter cited as Benfield].
24 Assertion by Dr. Morse, 70 N.J. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654; 137 N.J. Super. at 243, 348
23

A.2d at 810; by Dr. Diamond, 137 N.J. Super. at 246, 348 A.2d at 812. See American

Medical News, April 12, 1976, at 17, col. I [hereinafter cited as Medical News]. Although
Joseph Quinlan, the plaintiff, originally stated that Karen was legally and medically dead,

he later changed his position to assert that, under any definition of death recognized by

New Jersey, she was not dead. 70 NJ. at 20, 355 A.2d at 652; 137 N.J. Super. at 236,
348 A.2d at 806.
25 70 N.J. at 20, 355 A.2d at 657.
26

Karen had been on a respirator for more than thirty days and experts agreed that she

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss1/6
needed this aid. 70 N.J. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655.
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adopted any of the above definitions. An early Ohio case, Evans v.
28
Halterman 7 utilized the Black's Law Dictionary definition of death and
9 The Ohio Simulidentified time of death with the cessation of heart beat.
taneous Death Act3" does not address itself to defining death, but the Ohio
1
adoption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act does at least make reference
to this determination." "The attending physician or a physician selected
2
by the donor shall determine the time of death."" If the attending physician
is unavailable, "the time of death shall be determined by two physicians
4
having no affiliation with the donee."" The other safeguard in the Act
is that those physicians certifying death may not participate in the transplant
operation. Ohio's adoption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act reflects
a tacit acceptance of brain death in addition to heart death since the purpose
of the Act is to provide a legal procedure for organ transplants. Moreover,
it reveals a reliance on the medical community for determining time of
death and a majority of the medical profession today seems to give credence
27
to brain death 6 and to the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee's criteria. Using
the flexible definition of the Ohio Anatomical Gift Act, however, Ohio
could accept cerebral or lung death definitions if support for these definitions among the medical community increased to the point where such
2
positions were reflective of the ordinary standards of the medical profession.
To clarify Ohio's position for determining time of death, Ohio Representatives Nader and Fauver have introduced House Bill 1112. The Bill
delineates death as:
... an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In the event that artificial means of support preclude
a determination that these functions have ceased, an individual shall
be deemed dead if, in the announced opinion of a physician as based
on ordinary standards of medical practice, he has experienced an
27 31 Ohio App. 175, 165 N.E. 869 (1928).
28

See text accompanying note 13 supra.

29

31 Ohio App. at 179-80, 165 N.E. at 870-71.

§2105.21 (Page 1968).
31 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§2108.01-.09 (Page Supp. 1975).
32 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §2108.07(B) (Page Supp. 1975).
30 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

33

Id.

84 Id.
25

Id.

38 See authorities cited note 15 supra.

See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
If these definitions did not achieve this status, the attending physician or other physician
See notes 40-43 and accompanying text infra.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions. Death will have
occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased."9
As yet, this Bill has not been enacted into law. In conclusion, although
scant, the weight of authority seems to indicate that under the present
judicial and statutory law in Ohio, a person afflicted like Karen Quinlan
would not be considered dead.
II. PHYSICIAN'S DUTY OF CARE

Having made this assertion, what is the extent of medical care that
legally must be given to Karen? Generally, the test of adequate medical
treatment in a malpractice action in Ohio is whether a physician acted or
omitted to act consistent with the acts or omissions of physicians of ordinary
skill, care, and diligence, under the same or similar circumstances. 4 0
Further, the test for malpractice is not necessarily the recognized standards
of the medical profession in this and similar communities, but may be based
on a doctor's failure to use the degree of skill and care that a reasonable
doctor, in similar circumstances, would have exercised.' An Ohio court
held that customary methods of treatment will not disprove malpractice
where in fact such actions are negligent. 2
While the tests of "ordinary skill, care, and diligence"43 and of the
"degree of skill and care of a reasonable doctor"" may be easily applied
in some areas of medicine, they can only receive controversial treatment
in a situation like the Quinlan case. First, any distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary care wherein the latter classification justifies removal of
life-support systems is biased by the acceptance of different definitions of
death and by the recognition of different presumptions of an unconscious
and non-cognitive person's desire for life. Alternatively, Karen's care has
been defined as ordinary4" and as extraordinary;4 6 similarly, the New
3gH.B. 1112 (1976).
,oAult v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1928); Stol v. Balazs, 32 Ohio App. 117,
167 N.E. 522 (1929).
A1Morgan v.Sheppard, 91 Ohio L.Abs. 579, 188 N.E.2d 808 (Ct. App. 1963).
Id. at 593, 188 N.E.2d at 816-17.
See cases cited note 40 supra.
44 See text accompanying note 41 supra. The determination of reasonableness would probably
depend on expert testimony and medical opinion. Address by Dr. Sanford Press, President,
Ohio State Medical Board, Conference, supra note 14 [hereinafter cited as Press].
45 137 N.J. Super. at 248, 348 A.2d at 813. See Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of
Defective Newborns, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 236 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Robertson].
Robertson indicated that, for a patient not in an irreversible coma, the use of a respirator
is ordinary care. It would only be deemed extraordinary if life itself were not seen as a
benefit. Kilway, supra note 15, stated that the prolonged use of a respirator is normally 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss1/6
42
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Jersey Supreme Court decision has been interpreted as both rejecting existing
medical practice and ethical standards'7 and as codifying these selfsame
procedures."
Ordinary means has been defined as all "medicines, treatments, and
operations, which offer a reasonable hope of benefit and which can be
9
obtained or used without excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience"'
and extraordinary means as "all medicines, treatments, and operations,
which cannot be obtained or used without excessive expense, pain, or other
inconvenience, or which, if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of
benefit."5 In some ways, this delineation parallels Robertson's suggestion
that a defense of necessity might be available to a physician who is faced
with criminal liability for withdrawing treatment although, he admits, such
51
defense has never been available outside of an emergency situation. The
defense of necessity involves questions of the greater harm; where the
psychological, economic, and physical suffering of the patient, his family,
and society outweigh the harm of the patient's death, the doctor is justified
2
in turning off the respirator or other life-support equipment. Essentially,
Kelly's determination of ordinary care rests on the interpretation of
"benefit." Can a non-cognitive patient "benefit" from any type of medical
treatment? Perhaps, this kind of question has triggered the view that where
there is no chance of a return to concious awareness, omission of tube
feedings is good medicine.

53

It appears that the definition of ordinary medical care fluctuates
only considered extraordinary care where the patient is terminally ill and not critically
ill like Karen.
48 The plaintiff sought the power to discontinue all extraordinary medical procedures. 70 N.J.
at 18, 355 A.2d at 651. Dr. Javed testified that while the initial use of a respirator is
ordinary treatment, its prolonged use coupled with extensive nursing is extraordinary care.
137 N.J. Super. at 248, 348 A.2d at 812.

47 70 N.J. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655, reviewed, Medical Tribune, supra, note 2, at 3.

to Dr. Sidney Diamond's conception of medical standards, where cerebral
48 According
death occurs, a physician can terminate the use of a respirator. 70 N.J. at 28, 355 A.2d
at 657. See Medical News, supra note 24, citing Dr. John Thompson.
49 Louisell, Euthanasia and Biathanasia, 22 CATH. U. L. RE,. 723, 736 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Louisell], citing Kelly, The Duty to Preserve Life, 12 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 550
(1951).
50/d.

51Robertson, supra note 45, at 239.
52 Id.

Published
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53 See note

supra. Cf. Horan, Euthanasia, Medical Treatment
and the Monooloid Child, 27 13AYLOR L. REv. 76, 83 (1975) [herein4ter cited as Horan]
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within a given set of facts,5" and that where a patient is mentally normal,
even "extraordinary" means are willingly employed.5 "The 'quality' of
remaining existence, rather than the complexity or difficulty of proposed
treatment, becomes the principal determinant of what is extraordinary..., 5 "
Other criteria that have been suggested to determine what is ordinary
medical treatment are custom and the expectations of the patient.5 ' This
definition is rooted in the contract terminology consistent with the notion
that a doctor's liability for an omission is derived from the patient-physician's
contractual relationship. 8 In Ohio, even an unconscious patient may contract
with a consenting doctor " and once the doctor assumes this bond, he cannot
evade his responsibility to his patient without giving him reasonable time to
procure other adequate medical aid." While the expectations of the conscious patient may be ascertained fairly readily, those of the comatose or
non-cognitive patient are uncommunicable. Therefore the courts must make
one of two presumptions: that such a patient either would61 or would not"
consent to life-preserving treatment. Either presumption again rests on
one's interpretation of the value of a non-cognitive existence. An alternative
suggestion is that the doctor-patient relationship includes implied consent

54 See 70 N.J. at 48, 355 A.2d at 668; 137 N.J. Super. at 248, 348 A.2d at 812; Kilway,
supra note 15; Russell, supra note 15, at 141, citing Dr. Perrin Long; Comment, Antidysthanasia Contracts, 5 PAC. L.J. 738, 741 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 5 PAC. L.J.].
55See Horan, supra note 53, at 85.
56 See Cantor, Law and the Termination of an Incompetent Patient's Life-Preserving Care,
in DILEMMAS, supra note 13, at 78 [hereinafter cited as Cantor].
57 See Gurney, supra note 15, at 247.

58 See Robertson, supra note 45, at 225. A physician's initial refusal to enter this contractual

relationship would absolve him of liability. See also Limbaugh v. Watson, 12 Ohio L. Abs.
150 (Ct. App. 1932). Once that relationship is established, he or she must exercise reasonable care. The controversy of whether turning off a respirator constitutes an act or an
ommission is immaterial where aphysician and his patient maintain this contractual relationship. See generally Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REV. 999 (1967). Moreover,
the initial decision to put a patient on a respirator is usually to "buy time". Benfield, supra
note 23. There is no logical distinction between a decision not to use a respirator at all
and a decision to turn one off. Russell, supra note 15, at 145, citing Dr. William Williamson.
There is also no legal distinction within the confines of the contractual duty between doctor
and patient.
59 Tucker v. Gillette, 22 Ohio C.C.R. 664 (1901), aff'd, Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106,
65 N.E. 865 (1902). In McArthur v. Bowers, 72 Ohio St. 656, 76 N.E. 1128 (1905)
(per curiam), the court adopted the dissenting opinion in Gillette. However, the doctrine
of Gillette was re-established in Bower v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919).
60 Bower v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919).
61 See 137 N.J. Super. at 269, 348 A.2d at 823. See also Sharp and Croft, Death with
Dignity, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 86, 98 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sharp].
62 The New Jersey Supreme Court asserted it had no doubt that if Karen were momentarily
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss1/6
8
lucid, she would choose a natural death. 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
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8 3
to an omission if that is the medical custom. Because the standards of
the medical profession are ambiguous" and because some members of the
medical profession would prefer that customary standards were not definitively established,6" such a touchstone as applied in a Quinlan-type situation
is not very helpful.

III. PHYSICIAN'S LIABILITY UNDER PRESENT OHIo LAW
According to Dr. Sanford Press, President of the Ohio State
Medical Board, the decision to withdraw or withhold treatment from a
critically ill patient such as Karen could involve questions of suspension
or revocation of that physician's license to practice medicine" and therefore
would involve an interpretation of Ohio Rev. Code Section 4731.22" and
as to whether or not such action
specifically Section 4731.22(B)(6)
would be considered a departure from "minimal standards of care of similar
practitioners under the same or similar circumstances .... "19 If the court
determined that the physician was criminally liable for his act, his license
could also be revoked."0 Moreover, a physician's license can be revoked or1
suspended if he violates any provision of the A.M.A. Code of Ethics.
As noted by Dr. Press,"2 Sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Code, dealing respectively
with professional competence, neglect of patients, and conditions tending to
effect a poorer quality of medical care, are particularly applicable here."'
In addition to the possibility of liability for malpractice and of license
suspension and revocation, a doctor's decision to withdraw a life-support
4
system from his patient might create a liability for child abuse," for endan6
gering children"5 or for wrongful death."

63 See Vodiga, Euthanasia and the Right to Die -

Moral, Ethical and Legal Perspectives,

51 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Vodiga].
64 See 70 N.J. at 46, 355 A.2d at 667.

65 See 137 N.J. Super. at 263, 348 A.2d at 821.
66 Press, supra note 44.
67 OHmo REV. CODE ANN. §4731.22 (Page Supp. 1975).
68 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §4731.22(B) (6) (Page Supp. 1975).
69 Id.

70Omo REV. CODE ANN.

§4731.22(B)(11)

(Page Supp. 1975) (conviction of felony or

misdemeanor committed in the course of his practice).
71 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §4731.22(B)(15) (Page Supp. 1975).
72 See Press note 44 supra.
73d. See also Medical-Legal, supra note 16, at 33-34, citing the AMA Code of Ethics.
74 OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
75

§2151.031 (Page Supp. 1975).

OHio REV. CODE ANN. §2919.22 (Page Supp. 1975).

(Page 1968). However, if the paren t* or guardian
CODE ANN. §§2125.01-.04
REV.
76Omo by
Published
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1977
agreed to the decision, they would be estopped from recovering.
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A concomitant to the question of what is the extent of medical care
that legally must be given to Karen is the question: who is to make the
determination of the proper care for critically ill patients? The New Jersey
Supreme Court in Quinlan urged the formation of Ethics Committees in
hospitals;"7 adopting Dr. Teel's suggestion,"8 the Court recommended that
the decision to withdraw life-support equipment be based on a group
decision. Professor Mary Manuszak of the University of Akron College of
Nursing stated that the team approach would result in a collection of
knowledge and group support for the group's decision."' According to
Robertson, a decision-making body might be more capable of assessing the
different interests involved in each case than would a single physician.8"
However, Robertson noted that such a procedure could become too cumbersome and bureaucratized.s" He warns, ". . . such a committee structure risks
losing society's pervasive symbolic commitment to the value of individual
life, as well as embarking on the slippery path of rational-utility assessments
of personal worth."8 In addition, some physicians, while accepting the
position that consultants should be made available to them, reject the
committee approach and assert that the attending physician who has made
all previous medical decisions must alone direct the decision of whether to
withdraw a life support system from the patient.8"
If a doctor withdraws the respirator from a patient like Karen, under
Ohio law, is that physician liable for aiding or abetting a suicide or for
committing homicide? In Ohio, suicide is not an offense;" moreover, in
Ohio, it does not raise the presumption of insanity. 5 Because there is no
77 70 N.J. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668.
78 Id. See Teel, The Physician's Dilemmas A Doctor's View: What Should The Law Be, 27
BAYLOR L. REV. 6 (1975).
79

Address by Professor Mary Manuscak, University of Akron College of Nursing, Confer-

ence, supra note 14.
80
Robertson, supra note 45, at 264.
81 Id. at 265.
82Id.

&3See Kilway, supra note 15.
84 Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 153 (1872). Althought English common law considered suicide a felony, this classification is no longer valid in the majority of states and in

England. See generally Mathews, Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO
DEATH 25 (A. Downing ed. 1969); J. WILSON, DEATH BY DECISION 130 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as WILSON]; Kirven, The Right to Die, 39 KY. B. & B. 16 (1975).
85

Wheeler v. State, 34 Ohio St. 394, 398-99 (1879), citing Blackburn v. State, Ohio St.

146 (1872), and stating that even one who was disposed to suicide and who was for six
years in a melancholy disposition may be ruled competent. Id. at 399. See Speece v.
Industrial Commission, 46 Ohio L. Abs. 453, 70 N.E.2d 387 (Ct. App. 1945). Despite the

commonly held belief that a suicidal person is incompetent to make decisions, in some 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss1/6
pircumstances suicide
may be rational and evn proper. Sharp, supra pot, 61 at 97; Barring-
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liability for suicide, no one in Ohio may be charged with being an accessory
or principal in the second degree to suicide." There is, however, in Ohio
a presumption against suicide" and such may be the basis for regarding
an act similar to a physician's removal of a respirator as a homicide."
While suicide and aiding a suicide may not be crimes in Ohio, an act by a
physician, such as offering a lethal dose of morphine to a terminal patient
may8 9 or may not 90 constitute administering a lethal dose and consequently
could be interpreted as homicide. Similarly, the act of removing a patient
from a respirator might be interpreted as "administering" death. In
Blackburn v. State,9 where the defendant furnished poison for the deceased
with the intent for her to commit suicide and where the deceased accomplished this act, he had "administered the poison to her within the meaning
82
of the statute" and was liable for her murder. The pivotal question in
deciding if an act is homicide or aiding and abetting a suicide is often who
is the instigator of the act. 3
Where death results from suicide, under Ohio law, a physician is
required to notify the coroner of this fact.9" It is the coroner, moreover,
who makes a determination of the cause of death and who subsequently
notifies the prosecutor if such cause is suspicious." The pertinent sections
of the Ohio Revised Code that decide whether a physician who removes
a patient like Karen from a life-support system is criminally liable for this
ton, Apologia for Suicide, in

EUTHANASIA

AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH

152 (A. Downing ed.)

[hereinafter cited as Barrington]. In New Jersey persons attempting suicide are temporarily

hospitalized. 70 N.J. at 52 n.9, 355 A.2d at 670 n.9.

80 Address by Professor Robert Hopperton, University of Dayton College of Law, Conference, supra note 14 [hereinafter cited as Hopperton]. See Annot., 25 A.L.R. 1007-08 (1923).

Similarly, in Texas, where suicide is not a crime, it is not a crime to aid or abet suicide.

See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R. 1260 (1921). However, hospitals have been held liable
for failing to prevent suicides in non-terminal patients. Sharp, supra note 61, at 86.

strong presumption to this effect may be found in Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
156 Ohio St. 104, 100 N.E.2d 197 (1951); a weak presumption was asserted to exist in

87 A

Hrybar v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 Ohio St. 437, 442, 45 N.E.2d 114, 117 (1942).

Because of man's instinct to preserve life, it is improbable that someone would intentionally
commit suicide. Shepherd v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 16, 87 N.E.2d
156, 162 (1949).
88 See generally Annot., 25 A.L.R. 1007 (1923).
89

Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872). See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R. 1260 (1921).

90

See Hopperton, supra note 86.

9123 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
92

Id. at 163.

93 See Annot., 13 A.L.R. 1261-62 (1921).
94 OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. §313.12 (Page Supp. 1975).
95
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act are Sections 2903.0198 and 2903.020*. Section 2903.01 imposes liability
for aggravated murder upon anyone who "shall purposely, and with prior
calculation and design, cause the death of another."98 Section 2903.02
defines murder as follows: "(A) No person shall purposely cause the death
of another. (B) Whoever violates this Section is guilty of murder, and shall
be punished as provided in Section 2929.02 of the Revised Code."9
Because the Ohio definition of murder emphasizes causation, the definition of death that Ohio ultimately adopts would determine a physician's
liability. If Ohio adopts House Bill 1112,0 a physician's act of removing
the respirator from a patient like Karen would render that doctor liable
for murder and aggravated murder. 1 ' The New Jersey Supreme Court
suggested that Karen's death would not be caused by the physician's act
but would result from natural causes.' It should be noted, however, that
the New Jersey Supreme Court seems to have embraced the cerebral death
determination of death. '" The fact that the victim consented to homicide
is immaterial to criminal liability.' Similarly, motive, or lack of malice,
is not at issue in a murder charge in Ohio. 0 Moreover, the defense of
necessity is not normally available in a non-emergency situation. 0 It is,
therefore, likely that under Ohio law a physician's act of removing lifesupport equipment from a critically ill patient would result in criminal
liability; however, it should also be noted that juries generally acquit physicians of these charges. 0

96

Omo REV. CODE ANN. §2903.01 (Page Supp. 1975).

97 OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
98

OHIo REV. CODE ANN.

99 Omo REV. CODE ANN.
00

§2903.02 (Page Supp. 1975).
§2903.01(A) (Page Supp. 1975).

§2903.02 (Page Supp. 1975).

See Ohio H. B. 1112 (1976).
101 Professor Robert Hopperton indicated that, in his opinion, present Ohio law would
create liability for the physician. Hopperton, supra note 86. Similarly, in Texas, a physician
who participated in involuntary euthanasia would be liable for murder. See Forman, The
Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 54
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Forman].
102 70 N.J. at 51, 355 A.2d at 670.
103 70 N.J. at 19-20 n.2, 28, 355 A.2d at 652 n.2, 657.
104See Forman, supra note 101; 48 NOTRE DAME LAW., supra note 22. See generally
Annot., 71 A.L.R. 2d 617 (1960). However, evidence of motive may be admitted for the
purpose of setting a penalty. 48 NoTRE DAME LAW., supra note 22.
105 Hahn v. State, 38 Ohio App. 461, 176 N.E. 164 (1930). See generally People v. Robert,
211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920); State v. Ehlers, 98 N.J.L. 236, 119 A. 15 (Ct. App.
1922).
208 See authorities cited note 45 supra.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss1/6
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107 See RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 260.
'
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IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUESTIONS

What are Karen's constitutional rights in Ohio? Can she order her
doctor to stop treatment? The Ohio Constitution provides for freedom from
cruel and unusual punishment consistent with the Eighth Amendment of
the federal constitution.' According to Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in the Furman case,1"9 this constitutional guarantee is linked with
concepts of human dignity. That viewpoint, in turn, has evoked the question
of whether the privilege against cruel and unusual punishment embodies
0
a correlative right to human dignity." This question, while circumventing
a narrow and limited application of the Eighth Amendment, would shed
little light on the question of Karen's rights since there would remain the
threshold issue of whether withdrawing the life-support system under these
circumstances would promote human dignity,"' which is not so different
from the question of whether keeping Karen on the respirator is cruel and
unusual punishment."' Both New Jersey courts in the Quinlan case held
8
that the Eighth Amendment was not material to the facts of that case"
and that the scope of this privilege, as established in Furman, is confined
to state-imposed criminal sanctions."'
The Ohio Constitution also provides for free exercise of religion."'
Karen, a Roman Catholic, has constitutional protection for her religious
beliefs; however, as both courts in the Quinlan case noted,"' the state may
regulate religious practice where such conflicts with the government's overriding interest in preserving life."" Moreover, it is not a mortal sin according
108 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; OHIO CONST. art. I, §9.
238, petition for rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
110 See Forkosch, Privacy, Human Dignity, Euthanasia-Are These Independent Constitutional Rights?, 3 U.S.F.V. L. REV. 1, 17.
arguments suggests that such action will promote human
"' One of the pro-euthanasia
dignity. See Moore, The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia, 42 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 327,
332 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Moore] the lower court in the Quinlan case concluded,
"Continuation of medical treatment, in whatever form, where the goal is sustenance of
life, is not something degrading, arbitrarily inflicted, unacceptable to contemporary society
or unnecessary." 137 N.J. Super. at 269, 348 A.2d at 824.
112 See Flew, The Principle of Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH 30
(A. Downing ed. 1969); Williams, Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to the Non-Religious
Objections, in EUrHANASLA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH 134 (A. Downing ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
113 70 N.J. at 37, 355 A.2d at 662; 137 N.J. Super. at 269, 348 A.2d at 823-24.
109 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.

'14 70 N.J. at 37, 355 A.2d at 662; 137 N.J. Super. at 268, 348 A.2d at 823-24.
115 OmIO CONST. art. I, §7.
116 70 N.J. at 36, 355 A.2d at 661; 137 N.J. Super. at 266, 348 A.2d at 822.
137 N.J. Super. at 267, 348 A.2d at 823. The state's interest is particularly compelling
adult is involved. See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 1391
(1966).
"'1
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to Catholic doctrine and the Papal allocutio of November 24, 1957 to
continue Karen's treatment.1 18 This fact contributed to the New Jersey
Supreme Court's conclusion that ".... ranged against the State's interest in
the preservation of life, the inpingement of religious belief, much less religious
'neutrality' as here, does not reflect a constitutional question, in the circumstances at least of the case presently before the Court."'
Ohio recognized an individual's right to privacy in Housh v. Peth,'2"
a case in which plaintiff, a debtor, was continually harrassed by telephone
calls at her home and at work from defendants who owned a collection
agency. In Housh, the court held that such actions by defendants which
caused plaintiff mental anguish constituted an invasion of her right to
privacy. Further, in LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co.,' a case which involved
defendant's installing an extension into plaintiff's phone line at her estranged
husband's home without her knowledge, the appellate court enunciated a
test for an actionable invasion of a plaintiffs right to privacy: defendants'
acts must be measured against what is "offensive or objectionable to the
reasonable man.""'2 Essentially, the nature of the right to privacy is "to be
left alone" in matters that are not public.' Implied consent, however, may
limit this right. 2 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in the Quinlan case,
based their decision on Karen's right to privacy; the court held, ". .. the
State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows
as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.'' While
Ohio might find that Karen has a right of privacy, it may also find an
implied consent to treatment which would be a defense to the invasion of
this right.'12 The extent of treatment impliedly consented to by an unconscious patient who has not made known her desires by a "living will"'2 7
11s

See 70 N.J. at 31, 355 A.2d at 658-59; 137 N.J. Super. at 249, 267, 348 A.2d at 813,

823.
119 70 N.J. at 36, 355 A.2d at 661.
120 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956). The United States Supreme Court specifically
recognized a constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).

121 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963).
'

22

Id.

at 131, 201 N.E.2d at 536.

165 Ohio St. 35, 39, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1956). The right to be left alone may be
interpreted as codifying the right to commit suicide regardless of motive. See Sharp, supra
note 61, at 98.
124 Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1938).
125 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
12 6 See Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1938).
127 Advocates of the "living will" concept include: Downing, Euthanasia: The Human
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss1/6
Context, in EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH 20 (A. Downing ed. 1969); M. MANNES, 14
123
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or by other means prior to her illness, must still be ascertained. Is there
a presumption that one chooses to live even with a non-functioning cerebrum?' 28 Furthermore, is a patient with a non-functioning cerebrum
considered alive under Ohio law? 2.
In Quinlan, the plaintiff asserted that Karen has the right to selfdetermination,'" a right that is considered part of the general right to
privacy. 3 The right to self-determination embodies the value of individual
freedom and, within the context of this situation, asserts that a patient has
the right to make his own decisions."' Since, according to Ohio law,3
treatment without consent of the patient may constitute assault and battery,"'
and since a patient may, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
discharge a physician at any time,"3 an Ohio court may infer an adult
patient's right to refuse medical treatment."' Yet, the problem with such
an inference in the instant situation is that an incompetent, critically ill
patient cannot communicate how he or she would use this right to selfdetermination."'
Because of the right to refuse medical care and the absence of criminal
sanctions against suicide, some writers have inferred a right to die that may
8
be asserted by competent adults. 3' According to one article," the right
105 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MANNES]; Kutner, The Living Will, 27 BAYLOR
39 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kutner]; Moore, supra note 114, at 335, 337;
48 NOTRE DAME LAW., supra note 22, at 1244; 10 CALIF.-WESTERN L. REV. supra note
15; Comment, Due Process of Euthanasia, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
44 IND. L. J.]; 5 PAC. L. J., supra note 54. Cf. Vodiga, supra note 63, at 12. See also
Ohio H.B. 1235 (1976).

LAST RIGHTS

L.

REV.

130

See notes 61-63, 87 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 28-39 and accompanying text supra.
137 N.J. Super. at 251, 348 A.2d at 814.

131

Id.

12S
129

132
133
134

See Wilson, supra note 84, at 138.
Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).
See cases cited note 59 supra.

RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 38-41, citing Palm Springs Gen. Hosp. v. Martinez,
case no. 71-12678 (Cir. Ct. Fla. 1971), Guardianship of Gertrude Raasch, case no. 445-996
(Cir. Ct. Wis. 1972), and the Bentley case, Misc. No. 65-74 (Super. Ct. D.C.). See also
Horan, supra, note 53, at 81; 10 CALIF.-WESTERN L. REV., supra, note 15; Comment,
The Right of a Patient to Refuse Blood Transfusions, 3 U.S.F.V. L. REV. 91 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 3 U.S.F.V. L. REV.]; note, Informal Consent and the Dying Patient,
84 YALE L. J. 1632, 1648 (1974); note, An Adult's Right to Resist Blood Transfusions, 47
NOTRE DAME L. 571, 587 (1972). See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 1391 (1966).
136 See Hopperton, supra note 86.
135 See

See Barrington, supra note 85, at 163; Comment, Voluntary Euthanasia, 39 ALBANY
L. REV. 826 (1975); Comment, The Right to Die, 7 HOUSTON L. REv. 654, 667-68 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 7 HOUSTON L. REV.].
137
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to death is embodied in the right to liberty and in the right to pursue
happiness." 9 Legislation has been proposed to codify this alleged right" '
but to date none has passed. Some writers, however, deny its existence.'
To them, it is a confusing euphemism based on the specious argument
that where there is a right to life there is a correlative right to death." '
In the Quinlan case, the defendants relied on the Heston case to assert
there is no constitutional right to die' 3 and the Superior Court of New
Jersey refused to recognize this right."'
Assuming arguendo that Karen had a right to privacy under these
circumstances and that this right included a right to self-determination
(if not also the right to die), did Karen's father have standing to assert
these rights either for her or for himself as her parent? Because Karen
was comatose and had a non-functioning cerebrum, she could not make the
assertions that a competent adult could make in the exercise of her right
to self-determination."' Prior to her illness, Karen had made some general
statements to her mother and to friends that she would rather be allowed
to die than be kept alive by extraordinary means.'
At trial, however,
there was no other evidence produced relating to Karen's position on selfdetermination; she had not written a document such as a "living will ' "4 7
to indicate her wishes under these conditions." 8
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Mr. Quinlan the power to
assert his daughter's constitutional right to privacy. " The Court also
granted him the power to choose the identity of Karen's doctors so that he
could obtain another physician to terminate the life-support system should
Id.
140 Dr. Walter Sackett has proposed such legislation in the Florida House affirming a
terminally ill patient's right to die. Vodiga, supra note 63, at 17. See generally RUSSELL,
supra note 15, at 334-35.
141 See YOUR DEATH WARRANT? 132 (J. GOULD AND LORD CRAIGMYLE eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as WARRANT?]
142 See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
139

143 137 N.J. Super. at 251, 348 A.2d at 814.
144 Id. at 267, 348 A.2d at 823. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not address itself to
this question.
145 Id. at 266, 348 A.2d at 822.
146 Id. at 250, 348 A.2d at 814.
147 Courts have not given legal significance to the concept of a "living will" despite the
arguments offered by many of its advocates. See Moore, supra note 111, at 335; 44 IND.
L. J., supra note 127. Cf. Vodiga, supra note 63, at 10, criticizing the "living will" concept
as being too vague and not a statement of present intent.
148 137 N.J. Super. at 260, 348 A.2d at 819.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss1/6
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her treating physician, Dr. Morse, continue to refuse to take these measures."'
The Court, further, concluded that Mr. Quinlan had proved his competency
to serve in Karen's best interests' and therefore conferred her guardianship
Many writers and several Bills support the decision to allow
on him.'
a parent to give consent to withdraw treatment from a cerebrally dead
patient."" One writer has even created a separate classification for this type
of euthanasia; rather than regard such consent as involuntary euthanasia,
she categorizes it as non-voluntary.' The basis for allowing parental consent where a patient has experienced irremedial brain damage appears to
55
be an insistance that quality of life must be taken into account.' In
addition, the parents are most familiar with their child's wishes' and
7
they are the ones to share her burden." Advocates of this position argue,
moreover, that guardians of an incompetent patient are able to give consent
to allow organ donations from their ward and to permit him or her to
undergo non-therapeutic experimental procedures.' Similarly, a guardian
59
can consent to institutionalizing his ward for life.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, rested its decision on
essentially two lines of reasoning: one, the Court had no doubt that were
Karen miraculously lucid for a moment that she would make this request
for herself, ° and two, that the only practical way to preserve for Karen
her right to privacy was to allow Mr. Quinlan and his family "... to render
50 Ifd. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671.
Disagreeing with the lower court on this point, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
"' Id.
mat while Mr. Quinlan naturally felt grief, he had sufficient "strength of purpose and
ctaracter" to qualify him as her guardian. The court rejected the idea that his feelings
would distort his judgment. See 137 N.J. Super. at 269-70, 348 A.2d at 824. For a history
of Mr. Quinlan's decision to seek relief in the courts, see 137 N.J. Super. at 248, 348
A.2d at 813.
152 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671.
"- See RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 179, 229, 274-75; Wilson, supra note 84, at 194;
Fletcher, The Patient's Right to Die, in EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 65 (A. Downing ed. 1969); Kutner, supra note 127; Moore, supra note 111, at 327. Professor Moore
takes this position but adds a safeguard against avaricious relatives by demanding a forfeiture of 25% of that relative's share in the patient's estate. Moore, note 111, at 335.
Some euthanasia bills allow consent by next of kin. See 3 HOFsTRA L. REV., supra note
21, at 127.
154 RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 230.
155 See Kirvin, supra note 84, at 29.
56
See Robertson, supra note 45, at 262.
'
157 Parents of defectively born infants who are kept on life-support systems over a long
period of time incur great medical costs and suffer a higher than average rate of divorce
and suicide. See Benfield, supra note 23.
158 See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 56, at 86. See generally Annot., 35 A.L.R. 3d 692 (1971).
159 See RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 229.
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whether she would exercise it in these circumstances.' 6 1 The Court seems
to base the first of its rationales on the few statements Karen herself had
previously made, which in themselves were not sufficiently probative,6 2
and on the Court's interpretation of what the majority of people in our
society would choose to do if placed in the situation of never returning to a

cognitive life. 63

their best judgment, subject to the qualifications hereinafter stated, as to
It is interesting to note that in Ohio, the standing to assert the right
to privacy is not restricted to the injured party. 6 4 In Friedman v. Cincinnati
Local Joint Executive Bd.,"'6 a restaurant owner who was the target of
union antagonism was granted standing to assert his customers' right to
privacy. Besides allegedly instigating several incidents involving stench
bombs and stone-shattered glass, defendants placed a motion picture
camera at the entrance of plaintiff's restaurant and proceeded to take
pictures of customers entering and leaving the premises. The Court said,
... one must concede that persons occupying prominent positions in
public life and government impliedly grant the right to publish their
pictures. Private individuals likewise may do so, either expressly or
by tacit consent, but an ordinary individual, in our opinion and
according to what we believe to be the better principle, has a right to
6
insist upon his privacy.
Here, whether or not the customers would have actually considered defendant's acts a violation of their right to privacy, the Court implicitly measured
defendants acts against how a reasonable person would feel in this situation
and issued a permanent injunction against defendant's hostile acts.'"
Although Friedman may be distinguished from the facts in the Quinlan
case in that the defendants in Quinlan have not purposely tried to injure
Mr. Quinlan in any way (financially or otherwise), the fact that a plaintiff
may rely on an objective test for consent or lack of consent to an invasion
of a third party's right to privacy might well buttress the support in Ohio for
the position taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Quinlan case.
There are, however, some very strong countervailing arguments to
161 Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
162

Id. See also 137 N.J. Super. at 248, 348 A.2d at 814.

163

70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664.

164 20 Ohio Op. 473 (C.P. Hamilton County 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 86 Ohio
App. 189, 90 N.E.2d 447 (1941).
165 Id.
166 20 Ohio Op. at 477.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss1/6
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the position taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The most compelling
of these propositions is that it is unconstitutional to allow another party
1 68
According to Article I,
to assert an individual's "inalienable rights.'
Section I of the Ohio Constitution, "All men.., have certain inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty. .... 1,169 Because the right to life is non-transferable, the consent
10
of the victim of a homicide is immaterial; likewise, a humanitarian motive
1 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in rendering
does not excuse the offense.
its decision in the Quinlan case, did not address itself to this issue despite
7
the fact that there exists a similar clause in the New Jersey Constitution.
Court could have met this argument and still render
One wonders how that
73
its decision as it did.
Others have taken issue with allowing the family of a critically ill
incompetent to direct the decision to discontinue the use of the respirator."'
The Superior Court of New Jersey, for example, felt that conflicts within
7
Mr. Quinlan would distort his judgment on this question; ' the Court
considered it impossible for her father to maintain a position of disinterestedness. 7 Even if this were not so, one law review article asserted there
would be the problem of egocentricity, of not being able to know what was
in another person's mind.' 7 7 Although parents may terminate a dependency
relationship with their child, this does not mean that they may choose
7 8 The Superior Court of New Jersey considered the
death for that child.Y
168 See Hopperton, supra note 86. Similarly, with defective newborns, Robertson affirms,
"Although the law clothes the defective newborn with a right to life and a corresponding
duty of care from those in certain relations with him, many people think that that right

ends when it conflicts with the interests of parents, the medical profession, and the infant's
own potential for full development." Robertson, supra note 45, at 268.
169 Omo CONST. art I, §1.

(1868); Martin v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 1009,
37 S.E.2d 43 (1946).
Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920). See also cases
'71 See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 211
cited note 105 supra.
172 70 N.J. at 19 n.l, 355 A.2d at 652 n.l.
0
17 See State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128

Perhaps the Court would have insisted that it was not transferring Karen's right to
life to her father for his determination, but was merely using Mr. Quinlan to illuminate
Karen's attitudes about discontinuing a life-support system when a person is deemed to
a non-functioning cerebrum along with other physical complications.
have
74
1 See 137 N.J. Super. at 260, 348 A.2d at 819, 824. See also Robertson, supra note 45,
'7'

at 263.
175 137 N.J. Super. at 270, 348 A.2d at 824. But see notes 151-54, 157-61 and accompanying text supra.
176 137 N.J. Super. at 261, 348 A.2d at 819. Robertson is also skeptical of a proxy's

claim of impartiality. Robertson, supra note 45, at 254.
177 Robertson, supra note 45, at 254.
178 Robertson was talking about parents of severely brain damaged children, but an analogy
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question of terminating Karen's respirator to be a purely medical decision, '
where Karen had not made sufficiently clear her views on this issue. 8 ° The
Court was not so certain that Karen would indeed prefer death.' 8 ' The
lower court, therefore, in Quinlan, chose continuing Karen's life to be in
182
her best interests.
Although a parent may consent to treatment for his child,' he may
only consent to treatment that is beneficial for that child. 18 Similarly,
certain rights have been held to be purely personal in nature; a husband
or a parent of a pregnant woman, for example, may not consent or refuse
consent to her having an abortion.' 8 ' The right to privacy is considered to
be a personal right in Ohio'86 and the ability to sue for the invasion of
that right is extinguished at the injured party's death."' A final argument
against allowing a parent to assert his comatose critically ill daughter's
rights is what has been named the "wedge" argument;' 88 as one writer
asserts, "Even if the judgment occasionally may be defensible, the potential
danger of quality-of-life assessments may be a compelling reason for
rejecting this rationale for withholding treatment."'8 9 Mr. Quinlan's claim
of possessing independent rights as a parent was rejected by both of the
New Jersey courts.' 0 The only time standing is granted to a parent for
relief in propria persona is where a question involving continuing life styles
has been involved.' 9 '
179 137 N.J. Super. at 260, 348 A.2d at 819.
180

Id. at 260, 265, 348 A.2d at 819, 822.

181 Id. In the parallel situation of a severely defective newborn, Robertson questioned,
"But in what sense can the proxy validly conclude that a person with different wants,
needs, and interests, if able to speak, would agree that such a life were worse than
death?" Robertson, supra note 45, at 254.
182 137 N.J. Super. at 258, 348 A.2d at 819, 822. Generally, where a patient is unconscious,
the law gives constructive consent to physicians to preserve that patient's life. See Gurney,
supra note 15, at 244; 44 IND. L. J., supra note 131, at 547. See generally 36 ALBANY
L. REv., supra note 15.
183 See notes 158-59, and accompanying text supra.
184

See Horan, supra note 53, at 81.

185

Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).

186

10 Ohio Op. 338, 341.

187

Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970).

1s Advocates
of the wedge argument include: Hopperton, supra note 89; Kamisar,
Euthanasia Legislation, in EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH 85 (A. Downing ed.
1969); St. Martin, Euthanasia: The Three-In-One Issue, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 62 (1975). But
see Moore, supra note 111, at 337-38; Williams, supra note 112.
189 Robertson, supra note 45, at 255.

190 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664; 137 N.J. Super. at 266, 348 A.2d 822.
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A guardian, in Ohio, is required to provide necessary maintenance
Furthermore, proper maintenance includes nursing and
for his ward.'
medical services." 3 Failure to supply these resources and failure to act in
the best interest of his ward would probably constitute abandonment and
the forfeiture of a parent's rights as a guardian."' In addition, when the relationship of guardian-ward terminated, a former ward could bring an action
against him. 1'9 If the family consented to a physician's withholding treatment, it would be unable to bring suit against the doctor or the hospital
for wrongful death. 9" Yet, such consent would not bar a suit by other
relatives of the deceased." 7 The parents or guardian could also face
criminal charges."' They would be liable as a principal to aggravated
murder and to murder.' 9 ' Even if the prosecutor considered the family to
be under a great emotional weight, they could still be liable for voluntary
manslaughter."'0 According to Section 2903.03 of the Ohio Revised Code,
"No person, while under extreme emotional stress brought on by serious
provocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into using deadly force,
shall knowingly cause the death of another.""' Therefore, even a parent
in the position of Mr. and Mrs. Quinlan could not consent to causing
Karen's death without fear of prosecution.
V. Omo's INTERESTS

What are Ohio's duties and powers to preserve Karen's life? According
to the federal constitution, the state may not deprive a person of his life
without due process of law."' The Ohio Constitution specifically enunciates
a person's inalienable right to life."' Therefore, although the state has the
192 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2111.13(B)
'93

(Page 1975).

In re Burns, 79 N.E.2d 234 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948).

14 See Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299 (1877).
1"5 Kreglow v. Russell, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 385, 65 N.E.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1944).

See Sharp, supra note 61, at 98. Any claim under wrongful death would
difficult to maintain not only on the basis of estoppel, but also on the rationale
action requires that the plaintiff establish pecuniary loss by such death and that
show that "but for" defendant's acts, decedent would have lived. Address by T.
attorney, Conference, supra note 14.
196

"97

be very
that this
plaintiff
Scanlon,

See Horan, supra note 53, at 82.

198 See notes 96-99 and accompanying text supra.
199 Id.
2"' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2903.03 (Page Supp. 1975).

2"1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2903.03(A) (Page Supp. 1975).
202 U.S. CONST.

amends. V, XIV.
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power to end a person's life, it may only do so in very limited situations
where the person has received sufficient constitutional safeguards.
Where a patient is an incompetent, the courts have authority to act
in his or her best interests." ' Generally, this power to act has been called
the doctrine of substitute judgment.0 5 It has also been referred to as parens
patriae, "... . the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under
disability."2 0 6 In addition, the duty of the court to order medical treatment
has been based on the imminent danger of death theory.20 7 Where statutory
provisions do not specifically confer this power upon the court, 0 8 the
court may nevertheless find the power to act under its broad equity jurisdic20 9
tion.
The courts have disagreed on the question of forcing treatment on a
competent adult whose life is in danger.210 Where they have ordered blood
transfusions or other medical care over the competent adult's wishes, such
action has been based on several theories. It has been premised on a state
statute allowing the state to'intervene to prevent suicides,1 2 on the grounds
of "actual" consent,212 and on the competent adult's duty to a third person
or to society. 1 2 While there are conflicting opinions with regard to a
competent adult's refusal of medical treatment, the courts have rejected
a parent or a wife's ability to deny blood transfusions and surgery for their

204

See 137 N.J. Super. at 254, 348 A.2d at 816.

205

Id.

Address by the Honorable William Kannel, Judge, Summit County (Ohio)
Court, Conference, supra note 14.
206

Juvenile

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1968). Parens patriae has been invoked to
grant medical treatment over parents' objections. 10 CALIF.-WESTERN L. REV., supra
note 15, at 617. In the Quinlan case, the Superior Court invoked this doctrine and
differentiated the situation of a competent adult who is asserting control over the treatment of his body. 137 N.J. Super. at 265, 348 A.2d at 822.
207

208

In Ohio, the Juvenile Code authorizes the court to protect a child's rights. Omo REv.

CODE ANN. §2151.33 (Page 1968).
209

See, e.g., In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 87, 185 N.E.2d 128, 129 (C.P. Lucas County

1962).
210

See 70 N.J. at 35, 355 A.2d at 661. See also Annot. 9 A.L.R. 3d 1393 (1966).

15. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in the Quinlan case,
211 See RUSSELL, supra note
distinguished John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670

(1971), from the instant case on the basis that Karen would undoubtedly choose death.
70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
212See Moore, supra note 111, at 327, citing Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical
,Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
218
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21 6
child 214 or incompetent husband. 215 In In re Clark, an Ohio Common
Pleas Court ordered blood transfusions to be given to a three-year-old child
2 17
The Court held that a parent's
over his parent's religious objections.
collided with their child's right
it
religious belief must be ignored when
21 8
and while parents ".... may under certain circumstances, deprive
to life,
him of his liberty or his property, under no circumstances, with or without
due process, with or without religious sanction may they deprive him of his
21 9
life!"

In an emergency situation, a person is deemed to have given construc2
tive permission to receive medical treatment. In Ohio, there is also implied
consent to perform an operation or render other medical treatment where
there is a life or death situation. 2 " An emergency situation was found in
Ohio even where death was not imminent, but where medical opinion was
22
such that without a blood transfusion, the patient might die. Moreover,
a physician may have a duty to disregard a patient's wishes;.. while a
patient may knowingly refuse treatment, he may not be allowed to demand
that a doctor commit malpractice. 224 Once a patient has entered the hospital,
his course of treatment is a medical decision.2
While the courts have allowed non-therapeutic operations to be per22
formed on an incompetent with his family's consent, 1 they may only
2T
grant such permission where it is in the best interests of the incompetent.
Where the judge has not acted with the incompetent's best interests in
214

See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 1391, 1393 (1966); 3 U.S.F.V. L. RaV., supra note

135, at 104.
215

See RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 39, citing the Bettman case, wherein the Supreme Court

of New York held that the patient's wife was not allowed to refuse to grant permission
to permit surgery on her husband for a new pacemaker.
216

21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. Lucas County 1962).

217

Id.

218

Id. at 90, 185 N.E.2d at 132.

219

Id. at 89, 185 N.E.2d at 131.

220

See Gurney, supra note 15, at 244.

221

Urbanek v. Stotter, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 736 (Ct. App. 1926).

222

21 Ohio Op. 2d at 88, 185 N.E.2d at 130.

223

See Gurney, supra note 15, at 244.

224

See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 1391, 1395-96 (1966).

225

Id. at 1396.

226

See Cantor, supra note 56, at 86.
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mind, he has been held liable for his actions.2 1 8 In Wade v. Bethesda
Hospital,"9 in which a judge ordered the sterilization of a feeble-minded
girl, not only was the judge held liable for acting outside the scope of his
authority, but the doctor who performed the operation, the hospital at
which it was performed, and the employees of the County Children's Ser22 0
vices Board were held not immune from liability.
Finally, the state possesses police powers which pertain to safety,
health, morals, and general welfare of the public. 2 1 If a decision to end the
life of an incompetent adult would establish detrimental precedent for
allowing the courts to distinguish among different qualities of existence,
the state's interest in preserving a life such as Karen's may be regarded as
2
paramount.1
CONCLUSION

In 1906, Ohio became the first English speaking political unit to
introduce a Euthanasia Bill, 2 but Ohio's efforts in this regard were confined
to a competent adult with a terminal illness. 2 4 The Bill did not focus on
the situation of a critically ill incompetent person and, in fact, no attempt
to implement involuntary euthanasia has been made in the Ohio legislature
to date.
It is questionable whether the Ohio legislature would have the power
to enact an involuntary euthanasia bill without first amending its constitution. While the right to privacy may under certain circumstances be asserted
by a third person under Ohio case law, 5 according to the Ohio Constitution the right to life is an inalienable right.2 ' Therefore, where there is
See, e.g., Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971). Cf. In re
Simpson, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 180 N.E.2d 206 (P. Ct. Zanesville County 1962), in which
the same judge, defendant Gary, ordered sterilization of an incompetent. This act was
criticized by the court in Wade and the court reasoned that efforts in the Ohio legislature to authorize sterilization of the feeble-minded have met with public disfavor. 337
F. Supp. at 674.
229 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
230 Id.
231 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
228

See 137 N.J. Super. at 255-56, 348 A.2d at 817.
See RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 60. This bill was defeated and received much adverse
publicity. For a discussion of other states' and other countries' proposed euthanasia bills,
see MANNES, supra note 127, at 64-65, 98-99, 128; RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 188-97,
255-75, 334-35; WARRANT?, supra note 141; Louisell, supra note 49; Williams, supra note 112.
232
223

234

See

RUSSELL,

supra note 15, at 60-61.

235 See notes 164-67 and accompanying text supra.
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insufficient evidence of how a person would have asserted this right for
him or herself, as is the situation in the Quinlan case, the courts must
presume, under present Ohio law, that Karen would choose to live.
The crucial decision that the legislature must make is on the issue of
what constitutes legal death. In making this determination, it is exceedingly
important that the legislature adopt a definition of death that embraces the
attitudes of physicians and of the general public. Under House Bill 1112,"'
which accepts brain death as the criteria for determining time of death, a
patient like Karen would be considered a live person with an inalienable
right to life. The brain definition is the most acceptible definition of death
8
to many medical authorities" and is the one preferred by the author of
this essay. It makes provision for organ transplants while, at the same time,
it refuses to differentiate among different qualities of life. All of life is
considered valuable unless an individual himself deems otherwise. This
attitude does not refuse to recognize the plight of the family in circumstances similar to the Quinlan case. This burden, however, must be assuaged
by means other than ordering another's death. Alternatives such as a
national or state health insurance plan and counselling services, similar
in form to that of Alcoholics Anonymous, for the families of severely brain
damaged persons are possible ways to lessen some of the economic and
emotional problems besetting these families.
If, however, society and the medical community truly believe that
all Karens would definitely seek a natural death or that, in fact, Karen is
not alive, the legislature must adopt cerebral death as the legal definition
of death. If such were the standard, when a patient like Karen had a cerebrum which was not functioning, she would be considered legally dead
and would be removed from all health care. Should such a definition be
contemplated, however, great attention should be given to re-evaluating
society's commitments to brain damaged individuals; any decision made
regarding a patient like Karen would have equal application to these
persons.
WENDY C. GERZOG
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See note 38 supra.
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